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Property Law. Yanku v. Walgreen Co., 224 A.3d 1130 (R.I. 2020).
In Rhode Island, a commercial landlord owes a duty of care to their
tenant’s invitees only in three narrow circumstances: (1) where the
landlord beaches a repair provision of the lease; (2) where the
landlord is aware of a defect, but the tenant or guest is not; or (3)
where the landlord voluntarily “assume[s] the duty to repair.”1
Where no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the
landlord owed a duty of care to the tenant’s invitees, and the
plaintiff presented no evidence that the slip and fall resulted from
unseen danger, a grant of summary judgment is proper. Further,
the failure to obtain a transcript of the summary judgment hearing
where no written decision was issued by the trial justice will be
fatal to any appeal.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On December 31, 2019, Esther Yanku, an eighty-three-year-old
woman, sustained injuries after tripping “over a speed bump in the
parking lot of a Walgreens Pharmacy” in Cranston.2 The plaintiff
filed suit against the property tenant, Walgreen Company and
Walgreen Eastern Company, and also the property owners and
landlords, Jean Farmanian-Ricci and Joan Frattarelli.3 The
plaintiff brought a “six-count complaint against the defendants,
alleging two counts of negligence based on premises liability, one
count of vicarious liability, one count of negligent training and
supervision, one count of negligent hiring and retention, and one
count of negligent failure to exercise ordinary care.”4
The plaintiff alleged that she could not distinguish between the
yellow parking space lines and the yellow lines on the speed bump,

1. Yanku v. Walgreen Co., 224 A.3d 1130, 1133 (R.I. 2020) (quoting
Berard v. HCP, Inc., 64 A.3d 1215, 1219 (R.I. 2013)).
2. Id. at 1131.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1132.
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even though she had been there on numerous prior occasions.5 The
plaintiff admitted that in her previous trips she “must have”
discerned the speed bump.6 The defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment, which was granted on October 20, 2018, along
with a final judgment.7 The lower court determined that the
plaintiff did not offer any evidence that the speed bump constituted
a “hazardous condition . . . on the premises.”8
On November 1, 2019, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal.9
The plaintiff alleged that the speed bump “is a per se inherently
dangerous condition and can only constitute an open and obvious
danger if it is properly designed, maintained, and marked with
warning signs.”10 The plaintiff argued that the speed bump was
“negligently constructed and maintained” because the paint color
delineating the speed bump was the same as the paint color
delineating the parking spots.11 She additionally alleged poor
lighting in the parking lot.12 Lastly, the plaintiff insisted that
whether the speed bump constituted a dangerous condition was a
material fact of the issue “that should have been resolved by a jury
rather than a trial justice.”13
On appeal, the defendants argue that the lower court did not
err because the plaintiff did not offer any evidence that the speed
bump was an “unreasonable danger or that it was negligently
Additionally, the landlord
constructed and maintained.”14
defendants argued that their status as a commercial landlord
precludes them from liability or duty of care to their tenant’s
invitees absent narrow circumstances.15

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1133.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2021]

SURVEY SECTION

971

ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon review the Rhode Island Supreme Court sought to
determine whether the speed bump was an open and obvious
danger or a dangerous condition on the premises.16 Conducting a
de novo review of the grant of summary judgment, the Court had to
determine if there was a genuine issue of material fact.17
Classifying the granting of summary judgment as “an extreme
remedy,” the Court acknowledged that summary judgment is
appropriate absent genuine dispute.18
Further, the Court determined that the plaintiff did not prove
that the commercial landlord exceptions applied.19 The three
limited circumstances where a commercial landlord maintains
liability to their tenant’s invitees are where the “injury results from
the landlord’s breach of covenant to repair in the lease, or from a
latent defect known to the landlord but not known to the tenant or
guest, or because the landlord subsequently has assumed the duty
to repair.”20 Walgreens’ lease with the landlord specifically left the
parking lot maintenance to Walgreens.21 The Court also found that
the lease contract specified that the landlord is only responsible for
the repair and maintenance of the “exterior and structural portions
of the building and for the repairs caused either by fault of the
landlord ‘or by fire, casualty or the elements, or by dry rot or
termites.’”22
Next, the Court determined that for the speed bump to
constitute a latent defect the plaintiff must prove that the landlord
knew or “should have known of an unsafe condition on their
premises.”23 In the absence of evidence that the landlord was
responsible for the parking lot, the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment for the defendant was correct.24 Further, the plaintiff
16.
17.
18.
2018)).
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id. at 1132–33.
Id. at 1133 (quoting Ballard v. SVF Found., 181 A.3d 27, 34 (R.I.
Id.
Id. (quoting Berard v. HCP, Inc., 64 A.3d 1215, 1219 (R.I. 2013)).
Id. at 1133–34.
Id. at 1134.
Id. (quoting Bromaghim v. Furney, 808 A.2d 615, 617 (R.I. 2002)).
Id.
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was also unable to provide any evidence establishing that the injury
resulted from “unseen danger.”25 To establish liability for a slipand-fall case, the plaintiff must produce “evidence of a dangerous
condition” of which the landlord “was aware or should have been
aware,” and that the dangerous “condition existed for a long enough
[time] that the owner of the premises should have taken steps to
correct the condition.”26
Lastly, the Court pointed out that the plaintiff failed to produce
the transcript from the summary judgment hearing as required by
the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure.27 The Court held
that the failure to order the hearing transcript was “fatal” to the
plaintiff’s appeal “because it is impossible to conduct a meaningful
review of [the] case” where the trial justice issued no written
decision.28 The Court found that the plaintiff’s claim was based on
conjecture and speculation due to lack of evidence establishing the
speed bump as a dangerous condition, and, as such, the grant of
summary judgment was proper.29
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court firmly acknowledged that to
survive a summary judgment, a party must establish a genuine
issue as to a material fact. Merely alleging an accident on a premise
will not establish premises liability. Where a plaintiff offers no
evidence that establishes a genuine issue of material fact, summary
judgment is appropriate. The Court clarified that to establish
premises liability in a slip-and-fall case, the plaintiff must prove
that the injury resulted from “an unseen danger.”30
The Court also reiterated the limited scenarios where a
commercial landlord owes a duty to their tenant’s invitees. The
Court made clear that if one of these limited scenarios does not
exist, a commercial landlord would not be liable to the tenant’s
invitees. The holding reiterates that under Rhode Island case law,
a commercial landlord does not automatically owe a duty of care to
25. Id. (quoting Voccola v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 209 A.3d 558,
561 (R.I. 2019)).
26. Id. (quoting Voccola, 209 A.3d at 560–61).
27. Id.; see also R.I. SUP. CT. R. APP. P. 10(b)(1).
28. Id. at 1135.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1133 (quoting Voccola, 209 A.3d at 561).
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its tenant’s invitees. Rather, according to the Court’s holding in
this case, where a plaintiff alleges a latent defect, the plaintiff must
show that the landlord knew or should have known of an “unseen
danger” on the property.31 The Court’s analysis indicates that the
facts in this case clearly did not call under one of the limited
scenarios where a commercial landlord would be liable for the
injuries of a tenant’s invitee.
In addition, the Court explained that its task was made more
difficult in this particular case because of the plaintiff’s failure to
order the transcript from the hearing on the motions for summary
judgment. The Court pointed out that it has previously stated that
“the deliberate decision to prosecute an appeal without providing
the court with a transcript of the trial court proceedings is risky
business.”32 In its holding, the Court reiterated that the failure to
provide the transcript of the summary judgment hearing, absent a
written decision by the lower court, is fatal to an appeal. The Court
noted that Rhode Island case law makes clear that “unless the
appeal is limited to a challenge to rulings of law that appear
sufficiently on the record and the party accepts the findings of the
trial justice as correct, the appeal must fail.”33 The Court explained
that where the plaintiff fails to order a transcript, it is impossible
for the court to “conduct a meaningful review of the case.”34 The
Court indicated that without the transcript its hands were
essentially tied.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the lower court did
not err in granting summary judgment because there was no
genuine dispute as to the material facts of the case. The Court held
that the commercial landlord did not possess a duty of care to its

31.
32.
33.
2003)).
34.

Id.
Id. at 1134–35.
Id. at 1135 (quoting Mills v. C.H.I.L.D., Inc., 837 A.2d 714, 719 (R.I.
Id.
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tenant’s invitees absent an exception. Further, the plaintiff’s
failure to obtain the transcript of the summary judgment hearing
was fatal to the appeal.
Jill Elizabeth Magnus

